Audit trails that cannot be quietly rewritten.
FIRMA is an open specification for tamper-evident records in multi-agent systems. Every record is hashed with SHA3-512, signed with Ed25519, and chained to its predecessor — so integrity is a property you verify, not a claim you trust.
One formula, verifiable by anyone
Each record's hash commits to its content, its metadata, and the hash of the record before it (specification §4):
record_hash = SHA3-512(
firma_id ‖ record_type ‖ version ‖ actor_id
‖ canonical_json(content) ‖ timestamp_utc ‖ predecessor_hash
)
signature = Ed25519_sign(record_hash, node_key)Append-only by construction
Each record embeds the hash of its predecessor. Altering any historical record invalidates every subsequent hash — falsification is detectable by recomputation, without trusting the storage layer.
Independently verifiable
Verification requires only the record set and the published algorithm. No proprietary tooling, no vendor account, no network access. The reference validator is open source.
Storage-agnostic
The specification defines record structure, canonical serialization, and hash computation. It runs on PostgreSQL with write-once triggers today, and is portable to any append-capable store.
Measured, not promised
The current prototype detects contradictions between declared intent and observed behaviour with 72% accuracy on financial test cases. We publish what we measure.
Everything is public
Technical pilot — 8 weeks
We run scoped technical pilots for organisations evaluating verifiable audit infrastructure: defined dataset, measurable acceptance criteria, full access to the running system.
Discuss a pilot